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Abstract 
The linear mathematics of quantum mechanics gives many versions of reality 
instead of the single version we perceive, with the version we perceive chosen at 
random according to a probability law.  Because of these peculiarities, the 
theory requires an interpretation to be fully understood.  Over 50 years ago, 
Everett proposed in his many-worlds interpretation that these characteristics 
could be accounted for if the mathematics itself, with no collapse or hidden 
variables, was carefully analyzed.  We show this is incorrect because the 
probability law cannot hold for a system governed by linear equations.  Thus the 
many-worlds interpretation is not viable.  Some mechanism, such as collapse or 
hidden variables, must be added to obtain a satisfactory understanding of the 
physical universe.  
 
 
1. Introduction 
Quantum mechanics, which consists of a set of linear equations for the state vector, 
gives an accurate description of a wide range of phenomena.  But this theory has one 
most peculiar property; the state vector, which is essentially equivalent to the more 
familiar wave function, often contains several simultaneously existing versions of 
reality.  In the Schrödinger’s cat experiment, for example, the cat is both alive and dead 
at the same time.  Experientially, we perceive only one version—cat alive or cat dead—
but quantum mechanics does not indicate which one.  Instead, it gives the probability of 
perceiving a particular version.   
 Thus the mathematics of quantum mechanics seems to leave us with two 
unanswered questions:  Why do we perceive just one version of reality when there are 
often several in the state vector?  And why, if an experiment is repeated many times, are 
the frequencies of the versions we perceive governed by a probability law?  It is this 
second question which is of primary interest here. 
 Schemes which attempt to answer these questions are called interpretations of 
quantum mechanics.  One major interpretation is to suppose there are actual particles 
(or “hidden” particle-like variables), that the particles ride along on and single out just 
one version of reality, and that it is the singled-out version which we perceive [1,2] .  A 
second major interpretation is to suppose there is some process, outside the 
conventional laws of quantum mechanics, which collapses the wave function down to 
just one version [3-5].  If this process collapses the dead-cat version in the 
Schrödinger’s cat case for example, we would perceive a live cat.  There is currently no 
convincing evidence for either of these interpretations [6]. 
 A third possibility is Everett’s [7] many-worlds interpretation (MWI) which 
claims that a careful examination shows both questions can be answered using only the 
mathematics of quantum mechanics itself.  All that seems to be needed to fully 
understand the relation between the mathematics and our perceived reality is to give up 
the idea that there is a single, unique version of each of us.  It is this interpretation, 
currently one of the major possible ways to understand quantum mechanics, which is 
examined here.   
 We find the MWI falls short because the probability law, Born’s rule, cannot 
hold in a linear theory.  Thus the MWI does not provide us with an acceptable 
interpretation of quantum mechanics.   
 
2. Definition of the many-worlds interpretation 
The MWI as we define it is based on a “pure” version of quantum mechanics which we 
call QM-A.  The following principles describe the content and consequences of the 
mathematics of this unamended, linear, Hilbert space quantum mechanics.  
 
(1) Existence consists solely of the state vectors which obey the usual linear 
quantum mechanical equations of motion.   
(2) There are no particles or hidden variables. 
(3) There is no collapse of the state vector, so all the different versions of reality 
continue forever. 
(4) The only “objects” which perceive are the versions of the observer.   There is 
no perceiving “I” in quantum mechanics separate from those versions. 
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and the detector reading is perceived by an observer.  Then the equations of 
motion imply that the full state, after detection and observation, is  
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with version i of the observer having a valid brain wave function corresponding 
to perception of state i.     
 
 There are also several clarifying remarks.  First, the linear mathematics implies 
there can be no interaction, no means of communication, between the different versions 
of reality in the state vector.  Thus different versions of the observer are not aware of 
the other versions or what they perceive.  Second, the perceptions of which “I” am 
currently aware correspond to those of a single version of the observer—but there are 
many equally valid versions of “I”.  Third, no assumption regarding probability is made 
in the definition of QM-A (because probability does not directly occur in the linear 
equations of motion even though conservation of probability—once probability is 
assumed—is implied by the equations).  Finally, because we are attempting to explain 
our perception of results which conform to the probability law, we are concerned here 
with the probability of perception of a given outcome. 
  Everett claimed that QM-A alone implied all the properties—the perception of 
only one version of reality, the perception of eigenvalues of operators, agreement 
among observers, the perception of the exposure of only one film grain by a spread-out 
wave function, an explanation of the photoelectric effect and other specific phenomena, 
the probability law, and so on—that are needed to explain our perception of physical 
existence. (See reference [6] and [8] for a fuller explanation of how most of these 
properties follow from the mathematics of quantum mechanics.)  But we will show here 
that QM-A cannot account for the probability law. 
 
3.  Equal validity for all observer states. 
We suppose experiments are done on a quantum system with n states,  
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There is a detector, D, which registers one of the states, and an observer who perceives 
the reading on the detector.  We do a single run, and consider the system at time 0, after 
detection by the detector, but before the observer perceives the results.  The state is then 
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Now we consider the system at time t, after the observer looks at the reading on the 
detector, 
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whereU(t) is the linear time translation operator.  Under time translation, the observer 
splits into n versions so the state is 
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(Note that a “preferred basis” was not used in obtaining Eq. (4); it follows directly from 
the interactions contained in U(t).)  The problem is to relate this to probability of 
perception.  Note first that there is no “I,” outside the state vectors of quantum 
mechanics, that is somehow “assigned” to just one of the versions of the observer; only 
the versions of the observer perceive (principle (4)).  Second, we consider in this section 
the simplest assumption, which is that each version of the observer is equally valid.  In 
that case, there is a valid version of the observer perceiving each outcome i on every 
run; that is, there are many equally valid “I’s”.  But when every outcome is (validly) 
perceived on every run, there can be no probability of perception.  Thus, the probability 
law cannot hold if the perceptions of all versions of the observer are equally valid.  (See 
also the end of sec. 5.) 
 
 Justification of equal validity.  First, there is no obvious reason why U(t) 
should lead to a brain state which is not valid—that is, to a state which cannot 
correspond to our conscious perceptions. 
 Second, suppose we do a series of auxiliary “experiments.”  We set—by hand, 
not by experiment—the detector so it reads i and then have the observer look at the 
result.  Then we know from everyday observations that we are always aware of the i 
reading, so we must have 
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Then putting Eq. (5) into Eq. (3), we get 
 
          

 

ireadingofawareisandperceivesobstheofiver
iDiiat
n
i
..|
:||)()(|
1                      (6) 
 
We therefore see that linearity implies “equal validity” (all versions equally aware).  
And this returns us to Eq. (4), where the perception of every outcome on every run 
implies there can be no concept of probability in the linear MWI. 
 
 
4. Unequal validity. 
We see that if QM-A is to accommodate probability, then not all versions of the 
observer can have equal validity.  How might this come about?  First, in order not to 
tinker with the quantum mechanical mathematics, we suppose that all versions of the 
observer have a valid perception of the results in the sense that every version of the 
observer has a valid brain wave function, with a set of firing neurons consistent with the 
readings on the detectors.   
 
But then we suppose that—depending on the particulars of the photon wave functions 
which travel from the detector to the observer, and the particulars of the brain wave 
function—the perceptions of the different versions can be either “valid” or “not valid.”  
Or we could use the terms “aware” and “not aware;” or “conscious” and “not 
conscious” so that some versions are aware (conscious) and others are not.  That is, in 
an attempt to accommodate the probability law within QM-A, we suppose that not all 
versions of the observer have equal “validity.”  This would seem to be the only way out 
of the no-probability bind presented by the “equal validity” situation in Eq. (4). 
 To see the consequences of this supposition, we again do a single run and obtain a 
variation of Eq. (4).  
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v is a variable which has the value 1 if that version of the observer is “valid” and the 
value 0 if it is not.  A value of 0 means that, for whatever reason, related to the details 
of the wave functions, our “conscious” perceptions cannot correspond to that version of 
reality on that particular run.  This mixing of “conscious” perception with quantum 
mechanics may seem like a strange concept.  But the MWI failed to produce 
probabilities when all states were equally valid, so if this interpretation is to succeed, 
the only option left is to use the valid/not valid idea. 
 
What can the variable v depend on?  It can depend on the value of i.  And it can depend 
on the details of the photon and observer wave functions.  But the state that U(t) 
operates on in Eq. (7) does not depend on the coefficients a(i), so v cannot depend on 
the coefficients. 
 
5. The validity variable cannot lead to the probability law in a linear theory. 
We now repeat the n-state experiment N times, with N large.  The state at the end is 
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where jm  is the number of j|  states in  Nii |...| 1 . 
 
The average number of  j states perceived by the v=1 versions of the observer will be 
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 Here  Niip ,...1  is the “probability” that “the” observer is in the state corresponding to 
 Nii ,...1 .  But there is no “the” observer; instead, in the MWI, there is a version of the 
observer in every state, so the only values for the “probabilities” that make sense are 
  1,...1 Niip .  Therefore if the probability law is to hold, then we must have 
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However, ]...[ 1 Nii  is independent of the coefficients ia  so the left-hand-side of the 
equation is independent of the coefficients.  Thus Eq. (10) cannot hold in general.  That 
is, including the possibility of valid and not-valid states cannot rescue the concept of 
probability in the linear MWI.  (Note: The analysis of Sec. 3 corresponds to 1]...[ 1 Nii  
for all ]...[ 1 Nii .) 
 
6. The work of others 
Everett [7], the originator of the MWI, tried to finesse the probability issue in the 
following way:  He supposed the observer perceived only the end results, m + spins and 
 )( mN  spins.  The sums of the magnitudes squared of all those states with m + 
spins is 
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This has a sharp maximum, as a function of m, at 2||/  aNm .  Everett reasoned that in 
the limit as N approached infinity, all those states with 2||/  aNm  would essentially 
disappear (be of no consequence because their norms were essentially 0).  And thus the 
only states perceived would be those which obeyed the probability law ( 2||/  aNm ).  
But if N is finite, then in order to get the probability law, one must assume states with 
small but non-zero coefficients are not perceived.  And that is an extra assumption 
which is indefensible within QM-A, so Everett’s reasoning is insufficient. 
 Zurek [9-11] claims to have derived the probability law from basic quantum 
mechanics.  But his starting point is not QM-A because he assumes, a priori, that 
probability is a property of the state vector.  (This is stated in his Fact 2 in references [9] 
and [10]: “Given the measured observable, the state of the system S is all that is needed 
… to predict measurement results, including probabilities of outcomes.”)  This 
assumption, however, is contradicted by the reasoning of Secs. 3-5, which shows that 
there can be no concept of probability and certainly no coefficient-dependent 
probability law, in pure linear equation, Hilbert space quantum mechanics.  Thus, in my 
opinion, Zurek’s scheme does not fall within the bounds of the linear Everett many-
worlds interpretation.  And he does not specify how the principles of Sec. (2) are to be 
changed to allow probability in his interpretation. 
 
 There have been other attempts to derive probability from within the linear 
MWI.  Deutsch [12] uses decision theory while Wallace and Saunders [13,14] use 
subjective likelihood.  But none of these can get around the arguments showing that 
principles (1) to (5), including linearity, are incompatible with probability. 
  
7. Summary 
The many-world interpretation (MWI), first suggested by Everett, is based solely on 
principles deduced from the linear equation-Hilbert space structure of quantum 
mechanics.  There are no particles or hidden variables and there is no collapse.  There 
are several simultaneously existing, equally valid versions of reality in the state vector, 
each of which contains a version of the observer.  Further 
 
• Each version of the observer perceives its respective outcome on every run of 
the experiment.  Thus, because each version of the observer always perceives, 
surely the perceptions of the versions of the observers do not obey the 
probability law. 
• Only the versions of the observer perceive.   
• There is no non-quantum-mechanical observer associated with just one version 
of the observer.  So you cannot say “I” become version 17 of the observer with 
such and such a probability because in the MWI, “I” (including my physical 
body and memories) become every version of the observer with 100% 
probability. 
 
 Since each version of the observer has a valid brain wave function, 
corresponding to some pattern of firing neurons, it seems appropriate to assume each 
version of the observer is equally “valid.” In that case, the bulleted properties imply 
there is no perceiving entity, no “I” in the MWI whose perceptions could be governed 
by a probabilistic law.  Thus, under the “equal validity” assumption, probability of 
perception does not exist in the MWI.   
   
 The “equal validity” assumption can be defended by using the linearity property.  
But even if we assume non-equal validities—sometimes the brain wave function can be 
“consciously aware,” sometimes not—for the various versions of the observer, linearity 
still implies the probability law cannot hold.  Thus the linear many-worlds 
interpretation proposed by Everett is not an acceptable interpretation.  Some 
modification of it, such as collapse or hidden variables or perhaps even a fundamental 
difference between inanimate objects and sentient beings, must be added to account for 
the probability law.  
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